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MICHAEL E. BRATMANt
In Act and Crime,' Michael Moore defends "the voluntary act
requirement" for criminal liability. 2 In brief, this is the view that
liability to criminal punishment requires "the doing of a voluntary
act."' Moore's claim is that this doctrine, with one qualification,
4
is both accurate as a description of Anglo-American criminal law
and defensible as a condition on the justifiable imposition of
criminal liability.' Moore tries to ground this view in a conception
of action that is broadly in the spirit of the nineteenth-century
Austin and Holmes, among others.6 On this conception, actions
are concrete, particular events, involving appropriate movements of
the agent's body and having appropriate mental causes.7 Further,
it is Moore's view that the relevant mental cause will always be an
intention specifically in favor of such a movement-an intention
Moore calls a "volition."'
Moore's development and defense of the Austin-Holmes theory
of action is impressively thorough and rich in scholarly detail.'
Moore deserves great credit for bringing to the fore, with force and
clarity, basic issues at the intersection of the philosophy of action
and the criminal law. Moore has much to say about the two prongs
of his theory of action-both the idea that voluntary action must
involve a bodily movement,"0 and the idea that the cause of the
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2 Id. at 5.
3 Id. at 4.
The qualification concerns omissions. See id. at 56-59.
s See id. at 56-69.
6 See id. at 78-81.
7 See id. at 44-45 (describing the four theses which make up the "positive core of
the orthodox view of the criminal law's act requirement").
a Id. at 85.
9 See id. at 44-165.
10 Moore's understanding of this idea is quite strict: to him, "bodily movement
means motion (not stillness)." Id. at 82. On this view, if I intentionally stand
perfectly still rather than reach out to stop a child from walking in front of a car, I
do not, strictly speaking, perform a voluntary action. Bruce Vermazen has discussed
some of the issues raised by such cases for Donald Davidson's theory of action. See
Bruce Vermazen, Negative Acts, in ESSAYS ON DAVIDSON: ACTIONS AND EVENTS 93,
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bodily movement must be a "volition." His discussion of each of
these prongs of his theory raises important questions, but in this
Article I focus on the second prong. I distinguish between two
Moorean views about intention and volition, and then argue that a
planning theory of intention, along lines I have sketched else-
where,11 should accept one of these views but reject the other.
Moore calls the view that certain mental causes are distinctive of
voluntary, intentional action the "mental cause thesis," and uses the
term "volition" to indicate these causes.1 2 In his exploration of
what volitions are, Moore articulates two main theses. First, Moore
identifies volitions with a species of intention."3 In particular,
volitions are intentions in favor of relevant bodily movements (in a
sense of "bodily movement" that does not entail that the agent
acted). Second, Moore develops a general approach to intention
according to which intentions are distinctive states of mind, not to
be reduced to desires and beliefs. 4 Let us call the second view the
"thesis of the distinctiveness of intention," and the first the "intention
theory of volition." I am in broad agreement about the distinctiveness
of intention, but I think there are serious objections to the intention
theory of volition. These objections derive from our conception of
ourselves as planning agents.
Begin with the observation that we use concepts of intention to
characterize both our actions and our minds: we characterize
actions as done intentionally and with a certain intention, and we
attribute mental states of intending, or having an intention to act in
certain ways now or later. 5 A common approach to intention is
to begin with intentional action and action done with an inten-
tion. 6 From this starting point, it is natural to see the intentional-
103 (Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1985) [hereinafter ESSAYS ON
DAVIDSON]; see also Donald Davidson, Replies to Essays I-IX, in ESSAYS ON DAVIDSON,
supra, at 195, 220. Vermazen calls such cases "simple negative acts" and argues that
they "need not be bodily movements at all." Vermazen, supra, at 103. Vermazen's
discussion and Davidson's reply are relevant because Moore's theory of action is
similar to Davidson's in significant respects, particularly in the centrality of bodily
movements. See generally DONALD DAVIDSON, Agency, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND
EVENTS 43 (1980).
1 See generally MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON
(1987).
12 MOORE, supra note 1, at 45.
13 See id. at 120.
14 See id. at 120-21.
15 See G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION § 1, at I (2d ed. 1963) (suggesting similar
distinction of concepts of intention).
16 See id. § 4, at 9. Davidson concurs in this approach. See DONALD DAVIDSON,
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ity of action as lying in its relation to the desires and beliefs by
appeal to which we normally explain such actions.
Suppose, for example, that I want (desire) to signal for a cab and
believe I can do this by raising my arm. Suppose that is why I go
ahead and raise my arm. If you asked me why I raised my arm, I
would tell you that I wanted to signal for a cab and thought that I
would do that by raising my arm: I would explain my raising my
arm by citing an appropriate relation to my relevant desire and
belief. It is natural to suppose that this desire-belief explanation is
what insures that my arm raising is both intentional and done with
the intention of signaling for a cab. On this approach, for me to
raise my arm with the intention of signaling is just for my raising it
(or perhaps its rising) to stand in an appropriate explanatory
relation-a relation commonly seen as causal' 7 -to my desire and
belief. Similarly, under this approach, the fact that my arm-raising
is intentional consists of the fact that it stands in an appropriate
relation to some such desire-belief pair. In this way we are led to
see intention, at least as it figures in action, not as a distinctive state
of mind, but as consisting of certain relations between actions,
desires, and beliefs.
This is a reductive approach to intention in action. But what
about intention for the future-for example, my intention to fly back
to San Francisco in two days? As Davidson has emphasized, I can
intend to do something later and yet never act on that intention; 8
perhaps I die between now and then. So intention for the future
cannot in general be understood as a relation between desire, belief,
and intended action. Still, we could try to extend the reductive
approach by identifying intention for the future with some sort of
belief-desire complex. 9 This was the strategy of the nineteenth-
Actions, Reasons, and Causes, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS, supra note 10, at 3,
4-8 [hereinafter DAVIDSON, Actions, Reasons, and Causes]; see also DONALD DAVIDSON,
Intending, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS, supra note 10, at 83 [hereinafter
DAVIDSON, Intending] (containing Davidson's later views on the issue). I discuss these
matters further in Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. See BRATMAN, supra note 11,
at 3-9; see also Michael Bratman, Davidson's Theory of Intention, in ESSAYS ON
DAVIDSON, supra note 10, at 13, 24 (describing and criticizing Davidson's later views
on intention); cf. Davidson, supra note 10, at 195-200 (replying to my criticisms).
17 See DAVIDSON, Actions, Reasons and Causes, supra note 16, at 12.
18 See DAVIDSON, Intending, supra note 16, at 83.
"9 See Robert Audi, Intending, 70J. PHIL. 387, 395-96 (1973) (analyzing intending
as a special complex of wanting and believing); see also J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS:
INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 207 (1977) (endorsing a reductive approach to
intention); Robert Audi, Intention, Cognitive Commitment, and Planning, 86 SYNTHESE
361, 362 (1991).
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century Austin.
20
In a series of papers and in my book, Intention, Plans, and
Practical Reason, I explore and defend a different, nonreductive
tack.2 1 Rather than beginning with intentional action, I begin with
future-directed intention.22 I ask about the roles such intentions
play in our lives, eschewing the assumption that intention must be
reducible to desire, belief, causation, and action.23 I try to articu-
late the systematic relations between such intentions, other
psychological states, deliberation, planning, and action, and describe
a network of regularities and norms in terms of which we can
understand what it is to have an intention for the future.24 I take
this tack because I believe that future-directed intentions play a
central, coordinating role in our psychology, both individual and
social, and that it is an error to ignore them in theorizing about
intelligent agency.
In particular, we are planning agents. We frequently settle in
advance on partial plans for the future, and these plans then guide
and structure later planning and action. We do not only reason
about what to do now, but frequently try to decide now what to do
at some later time, and then figure out what to do in the interim
given our decision about that later time. I deliberate, for example,
about whether to go to Philadelphia next month. Having settled
this question by deciding to go, I then need to figure out how to get
there in a way that is compatible with my other, prior plans-for
example, my plans concerning my teaching duties at Stanford. Such
planning enables me to organize and coordinate my own activities
over time. It also enables me to organize and coordinate my own
activities with those of other agents-as I do when I make plans to
meet a friend in Philadelphia.
Not all desire-belief agents are planning agents. I do not claim
that it is essential to being a purposive agent that one be a planning
agent. I only claim that we-normal, adult human agents whose
actions are the standard concern of the traditions of criminal law at
2oSee I JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ONJURISPRUDENCE 450 (Robert Campbell ed., 4th
ed., London, John Murray 1873).
21 See generally BRATMAN, supra note 11; see also Michael E. Bratman, What Is
Intention?, in INTENTIONS IN COMMUNICATION 15 (Philip R. Cohen et al. eds., 1990);
Michael Bratman, Taking Plans Seriously, 9 Soc. THEORY & PRAc. 271, 285 (1983).
"See BRATMAN, supra note 11, at 2.
23 See id. at 7-8.
24 See id. at 9-10.
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issue here-are planning agents, and that this is central to the kind
of agents we are.
A common strategy in the theory of action is to focus primarily
on features shared generally by purposive agents, including humans,
cats, and mice. This can make some version of a desire-belief model
of agency seem compelling. This strategy may be useful in the
pursuit of certain questions. 5  But it can also mislead. Our
planning capacities-capacities at the heart of our ability to achieve
complex forms of organization, both individual and social-mark off
a distinctive species of intelligent agency.
2 6
Planning is the key to intention: future-directed intentions are
typically elements of partial plans. My intention to fly back to San
Francisco on Sunday helps coordinate my various activities for this
weekend, and my activities with the activities of others, by entering
into a larger plan of action-one that will eventually include
specifications of when to leave the hotel and of how to get to the
airport, and one that will be coordinated with my spouse's plans for
meeting me when I arrive. Such plans are typically partial and need
to be filled in as time goes by, and in stages, with appropriate
specifications of means, preliminary steps, and the like.
Reasoning aimed at filling in prior, partial plans is structured by
two major demands on one's plans.2 7 First, there are demands for
consistency: one's plans taken together need to be both internally
consistent and consistent with one's beliefs. Second, one's partial
plans need to be filled in as time goes by: one needs to settle on
subplans concerning means and the like. At any one time those
subplans must be at least as extensive as one believes is then
required to do successfully what one plans. Otherwise, one's plans
will suffer from means-end incoherence.
25 Jerry Fodor is an example of a philosopher who follows this general strategy in
his pursuit of a naturalistic conception of content and its role in the explanation of
action. This strategy supports his assumption that "common-sense" psychological
explanations of our actions are exclusively "belief/desire" explanations. SeeJERRYA.
FODOR, A THEORY OF CONTENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 4 (1990).
26 The need for planning to achieve complex forms of coordination and
organization is, I think, rooted in part in our resource limits-in our limited resources
for use in attending to problems, deliberating about options, determining potential
and likely upshots, performing relevant calculations, and so on. A theory of planning
will be part of a theory of what Herbert Simon calls "bounded rationality." See
HERBERT A. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 4 (1983); see also BRATMAN, supra note
11, at 10-11, 50-110; GILBERT HARMAN, CHANGE IN VIEW 97-113 (1986).
27 For a fuller discussion of these issues, see BRATMAN, supra note 11, at 30-32.
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Associated with these two demands are two roles intentions play
as inputs into practical reasoning.28 Given the demand for means-
end coherence, prior intentions pose problems for further delibera-
tion and thereby establish standards of relevance for options
considered in deliberation. Given the needs for consistency, prior
intentions also constrain further intentions. In this way, prior
intentions provide a filter on options that can be considered in
deliberation aimed at resolving the problems posed by the incom-
pleteness of the plans.
Consider again my intention to fly back to San Francisco on
Sunday evening. As part of a partial plan it poses a problem for
further deliberation: how am I to get to the airport from the hotel?
One solution to this problem might be to take the afternoon
limousine to the airport. But this solution is inadmissible, given
that I am also planning to meet an old friend in the afternoon.
Other solutions include taking a cab and taking the bus, in either
case after I meet my friend. Both are relevant and admissible
options. But which is superior? Here I weigh relevant desire-belief
reasons for and against these competing solutions; I weigh, for
example, speed and convenience against cost, in order to reach a
decision. This deliberation is framed by my prior, partial plan. My
prior plan provides a background framework within which I weigh my
desire-belief reasons.
For all this to work well, intentions will need to have two further
features. First, when the time for action is seen to have arrived,
one's prior intentions will normally guide and control one's
conduct. Having planned to take a cab at 6:00 P.M., if I see that it
is now 6:00 P.M., then in the normal course of events I will at least
try to take a cab. This will normally involve monitoring and
tracking: if I miss the first cab, I will try to get another. Second,
prior intentions, while of course not irrevocable, will need to have
a certain stability. If we were constantly reconsidering the merits of
our prior plans, they would be of little use in coordination.
This is part of what I call the planning theory of intention.
29 I
believe that once we have such a story in place little reason remains
for efforts to reduce intention to some sort of belief, desire, or
desire-belief pair.3 In this way, the planning theory helps support
28 See id. at 30-35.
29 See id. at 10.
o For a spirited attempt to combine planning agency with a reduction of intention
to belief, see generally J. DAVID VELLEMAN, PRACTICAL REFLECTION 109-42 (1989)
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a view of intention as distinctive, or irreducible to beliefs and
desires.
Let us now return to Moore's two views: the distinctiveness of
intention and the intention theory of volition. In defense of his
thesis of the distinctiveness of intention, Moore indicates broad
agreement with the spirit of the remarks I have been making. For
example, one of Moore's main arguments for the distinctiveness of
intention is that
human people are non-Sartrean: they regard their decisions,
resolutions, choices, etc. as fixing matters that do not again need
recalculation.... [W]e forge some new mental state out of the
prima-facie desires in conflict, because once we have resolved the
conflict with a long-term decision we do not in fact experience the
conflict the same way."1
I agree, though I would want to emphasize that in "fixing matters"
one normally does not make an irrevocable commitment: there
remain important issues about the conditions under which one
reasonably reconsiders such a decision. 2 For present purposes,
though, the important point is that a "non-Sartrean" decision issues
in an intention that then shapes further planning and action,
thereby supporting coordination.
There may, however, also be seeds of disagreement. As I see it,
the main argument for the distinctiveness of intention goes by way
of the roles of intention in future-directed planning. For non-
planning but purposive agents (cats, perhaps), a desire-belief
conception of purposive agency may well suffice. My argument for
the distinctiveness of intention, then, is not the argument that a
distinctive attitude of intention is always needed to connect desire-
belief pairs with present action. After all, nonplanning agents can
also act purposively, on the basis of beliefs and desires.
Perhaps Moore would disagree here: parts of his discussion
suggest that he wants to push equally both kinds of argument-both
an argument from planning and an argument from the general
(arguing that intention is a special kind of self-referential belief). I believe, however,
that Velleman's theory has difficulty giving an adequate account of (a) the distinction
between intention and the foresight of side effects, and (b) the sense in which
intentions provide reasons for action. See generally Michael E. Bratman, Cognitivism
About Practical Reason, 102 ETHICS 117 (1991).
s1 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 141-42 (footnote omitted).
52 See BRATMAN, supra note 11, at 60-76; Michael E. Bratman, Planning and the
Stability of Intention, 2 MINDS & MACHINES 1 (1992) (developing a theory of reasonable
reconsideration of a prior intention).
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structure of purposive action-for the distinctiveness of intention.
33
For reasons that will emerge, I think such a strategy may fail to do
justice to the significance of planning. (Even with my strategy,
though, once intentions are introduced as distinctive attitudes we
should expect them normally to play a direct role in the explanation
of present action.) So for now I will proceed on the assumption
that our planning agency is at the bottom of the argument for the
distinctiveness of intention.
Now, when we see the distinctiveness of intention as grounded
in our nature as planning agents, we have reason to be skeptical
about Moore's other thesis, the intention theory of volition. To see
why, it will be useful to canvass some possibilities left open by the
distinctiveness of intention.
Consider, first, cases of spontaneous yet voluntary action.
Suppose you unexpectedly throw a ball to me and I spontaneously
reach up and catch it. My catching it is under my control and
voluntary; it is not just like a mere reflex blinking of my eye. But
my action is relatively automatic and unreflective, so it may seem
strained to suppose that its etiology must involve a distinctive
attitude of intending, given that we are understanding intending
largely in terms of its role in planning. But we still have a voluntary
action in the sense of the voluntary act requirement. If, instead of
catching a ball, I were punching you in the nose, I would be subject
to punishment.
I am unsure exactly what to say about such cases.3 4 Perhaps
such spontaneous actions are best characterized as voluntary and
goal-directed, but not intentional (though not unintentional, either).
Making room in this way for actions that are voluntary but neither
intentional nor unintentional would allow us to hold onto the idea
that intentional action is always grounded in some intention. But
it would still entail that actions that satisfy the voluntary act
requirement may involve no intention, and that is a conclusion
Moore could not accept.
Let us, however, put to one side cases of spontaneous voluntary
activity and consider intentional activity that is guided by an
intention. Is Moore's intention theory of volition defensible for
such cases?
33 See MooRE, supra note 1, at 137-39.
" I discussed such cases in BRATMAN, supra note 11, at 126-27, and was unsure
how to resolve them.
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I think not. As a first step in explaining my reasons for this
skepticism, it will be useful to explore some complexities in the
relation between what one intends and what one does intentionally.
Note first that to say that my intentionally A-ing was guided by an
intention is not yet to say that my intention was an intention
specifically to A. I call the view, that if I intentionally A then I
intend to A, the "Simple View." 5 The Simple View is challenged
by three kinds of cases.
(1) There are cases along the lines of the video-game case I have
discussed earlier and to which Moore alludes."5 I might know that
I can hit either target 1 or target 2, but that it is not possible to hit
them both. Knowing this limitation, I might try to hit each target.
If I succeed in hitting, say, target 1, and succeed because of my skill,
then I hit target 1 intentionally. Yet I need not intend to hit target
1. If I did so intend, given the symmetry of the case, I would intend
to hit target 2, and so violate the demand for intention-belief
consistency. So perhaps I only intend to hit one or the other of the
targets, or to try to hit target 1.
(2) There are cases central to the doctrine of double effect.
These are cases where one intends to bring about M as a means to
an end E, knowing that a side effect of M will be S. In some such
cases, if one does intentionally bring about M, and thereby S, one
intentionally brings about S. Gilbert Harman has provided a useful
example: if you are fully aware that guiding your car into the tight
parking spot will scratch my car, then, if you still proceed to do so,
you intentionally scratch my car. 7 However, you need not have
intended to scratch my car.3 1 Such an intention would bring with
it, among other things, a disposition to keep track of the scratches
on my car and to ensure that you do indeed scratch my car; and you
need have no such disposition. 9 If you somehow missed my car,
" I first introduced this label in Michael E. Bratman, Two Faces of Intention, 93
PHIL. REV. 375, 377 (1984).
36 See BRATMAN, supra note 11, at 111-28; Bratman, supra note 35, at 381-83
(containing original discussion of video-game cases); see also MOORE, supra note 1, at
122-23 (discussing video-game cases).
37 See HARMAN, supra note 26, at 89 (discussing car example).
' See Gilbert Harman, Practical Reasoning, 29 REV. METAPHYSICS 431, 433 (1976)
(arguing that one may intentionally bring about a foreseen effect without intending
to bring about that effect); see also Bratman, supra note 35, at 375-405 (concurring
with Harman).
39 See BRATMAN, supra note 11, at 139-64 (discussing differences between intended
and merely expected upshots).
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you would not come back with sandpaper. So perhaps you only
intend to park your car, fully expecting thereby to scratch mine.
(3) There are cases where one tries to do what one is confident
cannot be done and yet, unexpectedly, succeeds. Perhaps you
believe your arm is paralyzed. Nevertheless, you try to raise your
arm and, to your surprise, you succeed. You raise your arm
intentionally. But, though you try to raise it, you probably do not
intend to raise it; if you are a rational agent, such an intention
seems ruled out by your confidence that you will fail. So perhaps
all that you intend is to try to raise your arm.
In each of these cases, the agent acts intentionally, and in so
acting is guided by some intention. Yet, for some of the actions
performed intentionally, there is reason to deny that the agent
specifically intends so to act. Such an intention would be in tension
with the demand for intention-belief consistency (cases (1) and (3)),
or with the idea that an intention to A supports guidance and
tracking in the direction of A (case (2)). So we have reasons,
derived from the planning theory of intention, to deny that there is
in such cases an intention to act in all the ways in which one
intentionally acts. The Simple View is overly simple.
Return now to the relation between the distinctiveness of
intention and Moore's intention theory of volition. Consider:
(A) IfS voluntarily A-s, then there is some bodily movement of S's
that is involved in her A-ing, and there is some intention of S's
that is explanatory of her A-ing.
One challenge to (A) may be posed by the existence of intentional
omissions that involve no relevant bodily movement." A second
challenge to (A) may, as we have just seen, be posed by certain cases
of spontaneous action. But let us put such concerns aside for now.
The important point here is that even if we accept (A), we still
cannot infer:
(B) IfS voluntarily A-s, then there is some bodily movement of S's
that is involved in her A-ing, and there is an intention of S's
that is specifically in favor of those bodily movements and that is
explanatory of her action.
(B), though, is required for Moore's intention theory of volition.
4 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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One might try to argue from (A) to (B) by arguing first from (A)
to
(A') IfS voluntarily A-s, then there is some bodily movement, b, of
S's that is involved in her A-ing, and S intentionally causes b.
But even accepting (A'), we still could not move directly to (B). This
is where it is important to see that the Simple View itself is problem-
atic. If, as I propose, we reject the Simple View, we cannot simply
reason from "S intentionally causes b" to "S intends to cause b."
The distinctiveness of intention, even together with (A), does
not commit us to the intention theory of volition. Moore sees this
problem,4 1 and offers further arguments aimed, in effect, at
bridging the gap between (A) and (B). These arguments, he says,
should begin with
the insight that there must be a causal relation between our more
general intentions (or plans) and the most discrete of the bodily
movements that execute such plans....
... [T]here must be both initiating causes for each of such
discrete movements and also monitoring, feedback, and correcting
causes for the continuation of each such movement.
42
I agree. In the absence of something like such "initiating," "moni-
toring," and "correcting" causes, it would be a mystery why our
bodies typically move in ways which, in the circumstances, promote
what we intend." But, as Moore notes, this does not show that
one must have intentions specifically directed to these discrete move-
ments.
Moore offers two reasons for thinking nevertheless that in
intentional action, one must have intentions specifically directed to
the involved bodily movements. First, we can be aware of these
involved movements upon reflection.44 Second, when we learn
"complex motor routines"-for example, learning to play the piano-
we usually start specifically by learning the component bodily move-
ments.45 But it seems to me that these observations do not suffice
to establish (B).
41 See MOOR, supra note 1, at 149-50.
42 Id. at 150.
"' See David Israel et al., Executions, Motivations and Accomplishments, 103 PHIL. REV.
529-30 (1994).
44 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 153.
45 See id.
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To see why, consider a parallel with perceptual belief. When I
see a chair, we may suppose, the chair is a cause of certain events
in my eyes and optic nerves, events which themselves cause certain
events in my central nervous system. The events in my eyes and
optic nerves may well be sensory representations of an object as one
of a particular shape and size. As Fred Dretske would emphasize,
these events may have the function of indicating that there is such
an object.46 But it does not follow that these events are themselves
a belief-a cognitive representation that plays characteristic roles in
reasoning and action-that there is such an object or, indeed, that
there is a chair. My perceptual belief that a chair exists may be
caused in part by a sensory representation that is not itself a belief.
To clarify this point, consider a commonly discussed example:
suppose that you are looking at a stick that is partly in water. The
stick looks bent, but you know that it is not. You have a sensory
representation of the stick as bent, but that representation is not a
belief that it is bent. Your background knowledge of how things
look when partially in water blocks a transition to a belief in a bent
stick. One of the things we learn in our cognitive development is
the need sometimes to block such transitions from sensory
representation to belief.
Now consider intention. My intention to open the window will,
if successful, cause appropriate bodily movements. The causal route
from intention to bodily movements may perhaps involve events
that specifically represent those movements and are also initiating
causes and monitors of those movements. Indeed, if Moore's
arguments show something relevant here, they show the need for
some such representations. But even if there are such (as we might
say, executive) representations, they need not themselves be
intentions. The planning theory of intention strongly suggests that
they need not be intentions. After all, I could rationally have such
an executive representation directed at a certain bodily movement
and yet believe that I will not so act. This seems to happen when I
try to move my body in a way in which I am confident I cannot.
And it seems that I could have such an executive representation
46 See FRED I. DRETSKE, EXPLAINING BEHAVIOR (1988) 62-64 (explaining the role
of natural systems of representation); see also FRED I. DRETSKE, KNOWLEDGE AND THE
FLOW OF INFORMATION 141-53 (1981) (discussing the difference between sensory and
cognitive representation); Fred I. Dretske, Aspects of Cognitive Representation, in THE
REPRESENTATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF 101-15 (Myles Brand & Robert M.
Harnish eds., 1986) (same).
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directed at movement X and also one directed at movement Y, while
knowing that X and Y are not possible together. 7 In both cases
my executive representation does not function in a fully intention-
like way. So in both cases there is good reason to reject the
identification of executive representation and intention.
Moore suggests that such concerns can be circumvented by
weakening the demands on intention.48 He suggests that some-
times one can rationally intend X though one is confident one
cannot X; and sometimes one can rationally intend Y and intend Z,
while knowing that Y and Z are not together possible. But I do not
think this strategy will get to the heart of the problem with the
general identification of executive representations with intentions.
The demand for intention-belief consistency reflects the ways
intentions and beliefs function together in our planning. Weaken-
ing this demand a bit would leave untouched this deeper fact about
the role of intention in planning. What blocks the general identifi-
cation of executive representations with intentions is that the
former, unlike the latter, need not be directly embedded in our
plans and planning, any more than a sensory representation of the
stick as bent needs to be directly embedded in our beliefs and
reasoning. Perhaps, as Moore suggests, we sometimes reflect,
become aware of executive representations, and incorporate
corresponding intentions into our plans.49 And perhaps we
sometimes reflect on how things look to us, and incorporate
corresponding beliefs into our system of beliefs. But this does not
mean that all executive representations are intentions, or that all
sensory representations are beliefs. A theory of belief that treated
all representations in the connection from world to mind as
themselves beliefs would be insensitive to distinctive features of the
beliefs of cognitive beings like us. A theory of intention that treated
all representations in the connection from intention to action as
themselves intentions would be insensitive to distinctive features of
intentions in planning agents like us.
The planning theory sees intentions as distinctive attitudes. On
this Moore and I agree. Nevertheless, even in cases of intentional
action involving movements of the agent's body and controlled by
relevant intentions, there is no guarantee that the agent will intend
4* Moore describes this case in terms of the ability to wiggle one's ears simulta-
neously. See MOORE, supra note 1, at 122.4 8 See id. at 122-23.
49 See id. at 154.
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specifically those bodily movements. It is a mistake to suppose that
intentions specifically in favor of the involved bodily movements are
needed to ensure that the agent's "more general intentions" are
linked in the right sort of way with appropriate bodily movements.
A theory of action for planning agents like us should, then, accept
Moore's thesis of the distinctiveness of intention, but reject Moore's
intention theory of volition.
